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Abstract  
 
We build a two-country open-economy monetary union DSGE model in order to explain some 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. We focus on the role of cyclical behaviour of public 
spending and sovereign risk premium. Pro-cyclical primary public expenditures in one country do 
not lead to higher interest rates on domestic public bonds in the short term as long as output growth 
helps financing public debt. Spillover effects on the other country can be positive on output as long 
as a real effective depreciation of the common currency leads to higher exports to the rest of the 
world.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The euro area (EA) sovereign debt crisis in 2010-2012 highlights the issue of macroeconomic 
imbalances across member countries in particular with regard to divergent inflation rates, GDP 
growth rates, ratios of public deficits and debts to GDP, and current account balances. These 
imbalances emerged before the international financial crisis of 2008-2009, but the latter has 
exacerbated them. As a matter of fact, in a monetary union with common short-term nominal interest 
rates but disparate national inflation rates (due to cyclical or structural country-specific causes), 
short-term real interest rates are different across countries. In countries where the inflation rate was 
above the euro area average before the financial crisis, real interest rates were very low (Spain, 
Portugal, Greece) and even negative for short maturities (Ireland). On the contrary, in some countries 
with lower inflation rates, such as Germany, real interest rates were higher. Then, indebtedness of the 
private sector rose and boosted aggregate demand in the former group of countries (henceforth the 
G4) while domestic consumption and investment rose more slowly in Germany. 
Over time, the G4 countries were bound to lose price competitiveness while Germany was likely to 
gain price competitiveness. Indeed, there have been rising current account deficits in those countries 
and current account surpluses in Germany (as well as in the Netherlands, Finland, Austria and 
Belgium). As a consequence, real depreciation was needed in countries with high current account 
deficits and a real appreciation was needed in countries with current account surpluses. As regards 
intra-EA real exchange rates, prices and wages had to grow slower in high-deficit countries and 
higher in countries with external surpluses. However, since 2008, the extent of adjustment has mostly 
relied on the high-deficit countries. As a consequence, the deflationary policies have been criticized 
for being harmful for Southern populations (in Greece, Spain or Portugal). As regards extra-EA real 
exchange rates, there has been an effective nominal depreciation of the euro over the years 2010-
2012. However, the extent of the depreciation might not be sufficient for some countries.  
Macroeconomic divergences across EA countries also stem from fiscal imbalances. Before the crisis, 
the public sector could borrow heavily as did the private sector in countries where interest rates have 
been lower since the entry into the euro area (given very low yield spreads on public bonds issued by 
EA governments relative to German bonds). Public saving decreased (in Greece and Portugal) and 
public deficits and debts have not been lowered as much as what was set in the fiscal rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, public spending has been pro-cyclical in the EA, except in 
Finland (Fatás and Mihov, 2010). In some countries (Italy, France), the ratio of public debt to GDP 
has not risen much despite some persistent public deficits, because they benefited from a context of 
low interest rates (and interest payments). In most other EA countries, the ratio of public debt to GDP 
was decreasing over the 1999-2007 period. Hence, the current issue of public indebtedness has been 
caused by the financial crisis. The bail-out of the banking sector led to a sharp increase in the GDP-
public debt ratio (especially in Ireland) and the recession led to an increase in public expenditure and 
a decrease in tax revenues more or less in EA countries depending on the size of automatic stabilizers 
and the extent of discretionary measures. Then, interest expenditure grew faster in countries where 
the sovereign risk premium had increased much (the G4 countries, and Italy).  
A higher sovereign default risk premium could arise because of a high level of public debt, fast rising 
public indebtedness, bad future prospects of economic growth or a higher probability of rescuing 
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financially weak banks (see Mody and Sandri, 2011). Contagion effects could affect the long-term 
interest rates in other EA countries. From 2009, long-term interest rates of EA countries had co-
moved, but in late 2011, as the economic hardship of the Southern EA countries was aggravating, the 
public sectors of some countries suffered from rising borrowing costs (Austria, France, and Belgium) 
while in some other countries, they benefitted from decreasing borrowing costs (in particular, 
Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands). The sign of these spillover effects on EA countries mostly 
depended on their specific economic performance and financial position. The latter was at risk where 
domestic banks had much lent to the public and banking sectors of the G4 countries. 
The EA crisis shows how financial difficulties of both public sector and banking sector are closely 
intertwined not only at the national level but also at the area-wide level. On the one hand, the banking 
sector rescue packages by governments could lead to higher sovereign bond risk premia (given the 
impact on implicit government liabilities) and consequently to greater difficulty repaying the debt. 
On the other hand, since banks hold sovereign bonds issued by EA governments, higher sovereign 
risk premia make their financial position weaker. As a result, banks decrease their lending activity or 
they increase interest rates on loans to the non-financial private sector (as in Greece and Portugal). 
Such behaviour impairs the transmission of the key interest rates of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) to interest rates on loans to households and firms. It aggravates divergences in the evolution of 
aggregate spending across EA countries. This negative spillover effect of higher sovereign risk 
premia on the borrowing costs of the non-financial private sector has lately been studied as a 
“sovereign risk channel” in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a closed 
economy (Corsetti et al, 2012) or in a two-country monetary union DSGE model (Roeger and in’t 
Veld, 2013). 
In this article, we want to explain macroeconomic imbalances among EA countries by taking into 
consideration various real and financial interdependencies between countries. In particular, we are 
interested in the role of sovereign risk premia and the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. We study 
their effects on the borrowing costs of other EA governments as well as of the private sector. Thus, 
we add the foreign public sector in the “sovereign risk channel” and show how the spillover effects 
can be positive, that is the public sector in other EA countries (such as Germany) may benefit from 
lower borrowing costs. To do so, we build a two-country monetary union DSGE model which 
combines the following elements: i) monetary union (MU) is open to the rest of the world (RoW); ii) 
there is public indebtedness (with a constraint on debt accumulation) and external debt (the net 
foreign asset position of the nation); iii) there are deviations from the law of one price between both 
countries within MU and between each country and the RoW; iv) there is a financial accelerator 
mechanism; v) banks lend to domestic firms and to each government of both countries; and vi) there 
are three endogenous risk premia, namely a firm risk premium depending on the net worth-capital 
value ratio, a government risk premium depending on the public debt/GDP ratio, and a nation-wide 
risk premium depending on the net foreign asset (NFA) position.  
In the literature on sovereign risk premium in DSGE models, the premium is determined in a closed-
economy (or closed-monetary union) framework. Since we consider an open-monetary union 
framework and consider a financial accelerator mechanism, we use a simple linear relationship 
between the sovereign risk premium and the gap between the level of public debt and a debt target. In 
Christoffel, Jaccard and Kilponen (2011), the risk premium is not linked to default but to a potential 
capital loss in case of selling the public bond before maturity. They show that pro-cyclical public 
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expenditure leads to a higher bond premium. As pro-cyclical fiscal spending increases output and 
inflation variability, the central bank may react more aggressively to counteract higher inflation 
variability. This leads to higher interest rates and hence a higher bond risk premium. Their result is 
derived from a closed-economy DSGE model (estimated using U.S. data). In our model, pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy does not lead to a higher risk premium in the short term, because public debt increases 
less than in the case of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. This is due to faster output growth and larger 
capital income tax receipts. Openness of both countries within the MU and with the RoW helps 
lowering the risk premium via the role of exports in output growth. In addition, the common central 
bank in the MU does not raise the common interest rate as much as in a closed-economy set-up, 
because the interest rate rule depends on average performance of member countries.  
In other respects, in Bi (2012), there is a non-linear relationship between the sovereign risk premium 
and the level of debt: the risk premium rises if the government approaches the “fiscal limit”, that is 
the maximum level of debt that the government is able or willing to service. In Corsetti et al (2012), a 
higher sovereign risk premium spills over to the borrowing cost of the private sector and amplifies 
macroeconomic fluctuations when the central bank cannot cut interest rates further (under a zero 
lower bound constraint). Furthermore, Roeger and in’t Veld (2013) analyze the sovereign risk 
channel in a euro area DSGE model, where banks are exposed to the risk of a decline in bond prices. 
They compare the contractionary effects of fiscal consolidation with the effects of no-consolidation 
in a context of rising public debt. In the latter case, higher sovereign risk premia spillover into higher 
costs of borrowing for households. In their model, banks lend to households and invest in domestic 
government bonds and bonds issued by foreign banks, but they do not lend to the corporate sector, 
while in ours, banks lend to the domestic corporate sector, domestic government and foreign 
government in the rest of the union (RoU) but not to the households. The latter hold bonds issued by 
the RoW.  
In our model, there are several channels by which macroeconomic performance of MU countries is 
interdependent and may diverge. The trade channel works through both intra-MU and extra-MU 
change in net exports and bilateral real exchange rates. The credit channel concerns the transmission 
of the common monetary policy to domestic production and inflation in both MU countries via the 
banking sector’s balance sheet.  The share of consumers’ deposits that banks lend to borrowers 
depends on economic activity. As for the fiscal channel, it denotes the fiscal causes of 
macroeconomic divergences across MU countries. We also compare the implications of a counter-
cyclical vs. pro-cyclical reaction of public primary expenditure to deviations of output from its 
steady-state level. Finally, there is also a sovereign risk channel: given banks’ holdings of public 
bonds issued by governments of both MU countries, higher public indebtedness has an impact on the 
bank lending to firms.  
We find that pro-cyclical spending in one country makes it harder to stabilize debt and accentuates 
negative spillover effects on aggregate spending (absorption) in the other country. A higher risk 
premium in one country has two opposite effects on the other country: borrowing costs are lower for 
the public sector but higher for the non-financial private sector. In all cases, the other country can 
benefit from positive spillover effects on output as long as the effective real depreciation of the 
common currency leads to higher net exports to the RoW. 
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In what follows, we set the DSGE model of a two-country open-economy monetary union (section 
2). We then describe the calibration and explain the results of our simulations (section 3). We finally 
conclude (section 4). 
 
 
2. A two-country open-economy monetary union DSGE model with risk premia 
 
We consider two symmetric countries of equal size, home	ሺ݄ሻ	and	foreignሺ݂ሻ. They are members of 
a monetary union and are open to the rest of the world (ݓ) which is fully exogenous (in the small 
open economy perspective). The model contains price stickiness, monopolistic competition in final 
goods market, capital adjustment costs, incomplete pass-through of exchange rate via law of one 
price deviation, financial market frictions and fiscal policy instruments.  
Each economy is populated by households, banks, government and three types of producers: 
entrepreneurs, capital producers, and retailers (domestic and imported goods retailers). There is a 
common monetary authority that sets the unique nominal risk-free interest rate for both countries. 
Capital producers build new capital and sell it to the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs produce wholesale 
goods and sell them to domestic goods retailers. Domestic and imported goods retailers set nominal 
prices of final goods à la Calvo (1983). Banks convert households’ deposits in loans to finance the 
government deficit and the entrepreneurial purchase of capital. Each government decides upon fiscal 
policy.  
Our model shares some common features with those of other DSGE models of the euro area. Indeed, 
there are both real rigidities (habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs in investment) and 
nominal rigidities (Calvo probability of not being able to reset prices) as in Smets and Wouters 
(2002), Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2008), Erceg and Lindé (2012). Each government finances 
public purchases (consumption and transfers) by levying taxes (on consumption and capital income) 
and issuing debt. We ignore seignoriage and taxes on labour services and wages unlike Coenen, 
McAdam and Straub (2008). Following Christoffel, Jaccard and Kilponen (2011), we assume that 
each government adjusts the fiscal instrument (public consumption in our model) with reaction to 
output growth and the level of debt (in deviation with its steady-state level). We add some degree of 
inertia in the adjustment of fiscal instrument. 
This model has also specific features that distinguish it from standard models of monetary union 
(MU). The exposure of domestic banks to foreign government debt in the rest of the union (RoU) 
allows us to study the potential contagion effects working through sovereign debts within the 
monetary union. Moreover, since monetary union is open with the rest of the world (RoW), we can 
take into account both intra and extra-zone net exports of each country and underline the importance 
of trade openness in times of regional economic turmoil. Finally, deviations from the law of one price 
and imperfect exchange-rate pass-through capture the fact that there are country-specific factors of 
inflation. At least, they cushion the impact of price variations in one country on the other country.  
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2.1. Households 
 
Each country ݅ ∈ 	 ሼ݄, ݂ሽ	is populated by a continuum of unit mass households with infinite life. The 
representative household of country ݅ maximizes the following expected discounted sum of utilities:    
ܧ௧෍ߚ௧ ቆሺܥ௧
௜ െ ݄ܥ௧ିଵ௜ ሻଵିఙ
1 െ ߪ െ
ሺ ௧ܰ௜ሻଵାఎ
1 ൅ ߟ ቇ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
																																																																																													ሺ1ሻ 
where ܥ௧௜ is aggregate consumption and ௧ܰ௜ denotes the number of hours worked. ܧ௧ is the conditional 
expectation operator. The parameters  0 ൏ ߚ ൏ 1 ,  ߪ ൐ 0 , ߟ ൐ 0  and 0 ൏ ݄ ൏ 1 are, respectively, 
the subjective discount factor,  the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the  inverse of the 
Frisch elasticity of labour supply and the parameter that controls habit persistence. 
The household’s period-by-period budget constraint is defined by: 
൫1 ൅ ߬௖,௧௜ ൯ܥ௧௜ ൅ ܦ௧
௜
௧ܲ௜
൅ ܵ௧ܤ௪,௧
௜
௧ܲ௜
ൌ ௧ܹ
௜
௧ܲ௜
௧ܰ௜ ൅ ܴ௧ିଵ ܦ௧ିଵ
௜
௧ܲ௜
൅ ܴ௪,௧ିଵΨ௕,௧ିଵ௜ ൫ܾ௧ିଵ௜ , ܼ௧ିଵ௜ ൯ ܵ௧ܤ௪,௧ିଵ
௜
௧ܲ௜
൅ ܴܶ௧
௜
௧ܲ௜
൅ Λ௧௜ 										ሺ2ሻ 
where ௧ܲ௜ is the consumer price index (CPI), ௧ܹ௜ 	the nominal wage, ܦ௧௜ nominal deposits that pay 
gross nominal interest rate ܴ௧ and ܤ௪,௧௜  nominal internationally traded bonds, denominated in rest of 
the world currency, that pay a gross nominal interest rate ܴ௪,௧ିଵΨ௕,௧ିଵ௜ . ܵ௧ is the nominal exchange 
rate (expressed in terms of units of home currency per unit of foreign currency). ߬௖,௧௜ , ܴܶ௧௜  and Λ௧௜  are, 
respectively, distortionary tax rate on consumption, government transfers and real profits from the 
monopolistic sector. Finally, Ψ௕,௧௜  represents a risk premium that is a function of the economy’s real 
aggregate level of net-foreign asset position in percentage of steady-state output, as follows:  
Ψ௕,௧௜ ൫ܾ௧௜, ܼ௧௜൯ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ቆെ	߰௕௜ ቆܵ௧ܤ௪,௧
௜
ܻ ௧ܲ௜ ቇ ൅ ܼ௧
௜ቇ																																																																																										ሺ3ሻ 
where ܾ௧௜ ≡ ௌ೟஻ೢ,೟
೔
௒௉೟೔  is real aggregate net-foreign asset position in percentage of steady-state GDP; 
߰௕௜ ൐ 0 is a measure of the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to net-foreign asset (NFA) 
position. Whenever the NFA is negative, the nation is a net borrower. The variable ܼ௧௜ is an 
exogenous shock on risk premium defined by log൫ܼ௧௜	൯ ൌ ߩ௭ log൫ܼ௧ିଵ௜ ൯ ൅	݁௭,௧ with 
݁௭,௧~݅. ݅. ݀	ሺ0, ߪ௘೥ଶ ሻ. The term Ψ௕,௧௜ ൫ܾ௧௜, ܼ௧௜൯ is assumed to be strictly decreasing in ܾ௧௜ and satisfies 
Ψ௕௜ሺ0,0ሻ ൌ 1. It captures imperfect integration in the international financial markets and ensures a 
well-defined steady-state in the model (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003). 
Households choose the paths for ൛ܥ௧௜, ௧ܰ௜ , ܦ௧௜, ܤ௪,௧௜ ൟ଴
ஶ
 in order to maximize (1) subject to the budget 
constraint in (2). The following optimality conditions hold: 
ሺܥ௧௜ െ ݄ܥ௧ିଵ௜ ሻିఙ െ ߚ݄	ܧ௧ሺܥ௧ାଵ௜ െ ݄ܥ௧௜ሻିఙ ൌ ߣ௧௜ ൫1 ൅ ߬௖,௧௜ ൯																																																																	ሺ4ሻ 
ߣ௧௜ ௧ܹ
௜
௧ܲ௜
ൌ ሺ ௧ܰ௜ሻఎ																																																																																																																																													ሺ5ሻ 
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െߣ௧
௜ ܵ௧
௧ܲ௜
൅ ܧ௧ߚ ߣ௧ାଵ
௜ ܵ௧ାଵ
௧ܲାଵ௜
ܴ௪,௧Ψ௕,௧௜ ൫ܾ௧௜, ܼ௧௜൯ ൌ 0																																																																																								ሺ6ሻ 
െ ߣ௧
௜
௧ܲ௜
൅ ܧ௧ߚ ߣ௧ାଵ
௜
௧ܲାଵ௜
ܴ௧ ൌ 0																																																																																																																													ሺ7ሻ	 
ߣ௧௜  is the Lagrangian multiplier in (4), (5), (6) and (7). 
The final good,	ܺ௧௜, is allocated to consumption, ܥ௧௜, investment, ܫ௧௜, and public spending, ܩ௧௜. It is an 
aggregate function of goods produced in the home country, ௜ܺ,௧௜ , in the RoU,	ܺ௞,௧௜ , and in the RoW, 
ܺ௪,௧௜ : 
ܺ௧௜ ൌ 	 ቈ൫1 െ ܽଵ௜ െ ܽଶ௜ ൯
ଵ
ఏ൫ ௜ܺ,௧௜ ൯
ఏିଵ
ఏ ൅ ሺܽଵ௜ ሻ
ଵ
ఏ൫ܺ௞,௧௜ ൯
ఏିଵ
ఏ ൅ ሺܽଶ௜ ሻ
ଵ
ఏ൫ܺ௪,௧௜ ൯
ఏିଵ
ఏ ቉
ఏ
ఏିଵ 																																	ሺ8ሻ	 
for ܺ ൌ ሼܥ, ܫ, ܩሽ;  ݅, ݇	 ∈ ሼ݄, ݂ሽ	and	݅ ് ݇.  
The parameters ߠ ൐ 1, ܽଵ௜ , and ܽଶ௜  are, respectively, the elasticity of substitution between the three 
types of goods, the share of imported goods from the RoU and the share of imported goods from the 
RoW. We suppose that these shares are identical reciprocally between each country ݅ ∈ ሼ݄, ݂ሽ of the 
union and the RoW. Therefore, the fraction	൫1 െ ܽଵ௜ െ ܽଶ௜ ൯ is the degree of home bias in 
consumption, investment and public goods. 
The price index (CPI) associated to (8) is given by: 
௧ܲ௜ ൌ 	 ቂ൫1 െ ܽଵ௜ െ ܽଶ௜ ൯൫ ௜ܲ,௧௜ ൯ଵିఏ ൅ ܽଵ௜ ൫ ௞ܲ,௧௜ ൯ଵିఏ ൅ ܽଶ௜ ൫ ௪ܲ,௧௜ ൯ଵିఏቃ
ଵ
ଵିఏ 																																																ሺ9ሻ 
 
where ௜ܲ,௧௜ 	 ௞ܲ,௧௜  and ௪ܲ,௧௜  are, respectively, the domestic price of home goods, the domestic price of 
imported goods from the RoU and the domestic price of imported goods from the RoW.  
We define  ௜ܺ,௧௜ ≡ ൬׬ ௜ܺ,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ
ഖషభ
ഖ ௝݀
ଵ
଴ ൰
ഖ
ഖషభ 	,  ܺ௞,௧௜ ≡ ൬׬ ܺ௞,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ
ഖషభ
ഖ ௝݀
ଵ
଴ ൰
ഖ
ഖషభ 	 and 
ܺ௪,௧௜ ≡ ൬׬ ܺ௪,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ
ഖషభ
ഖ ௝݀
ଵ
଴ ൰
ഖ
ഖషభ 	as  the  composite aggregates of  diﬀerentiated varieties produced 
domestically,  inside and outside the monetary union, respectively, with ߯ being  the elasticity  of 
substitution between varieties originating in the same country;  ௜ܺ,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ, ܺ௞,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ and ܺ௪,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ being a 
typical variety ݆ of  domestic goods, imported goods from the RoU and imported  goods from RoW, 
respectively. The corresponding prices are deduced easily and are given by, respectively:  
௜ܲ,௧௜ ൌ ቀ׬ ௜ܲ,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻଵିఞ ௝݀ଵ଴ ቁ
భ
భషഖ 	,    ௞ܲ,௧௜ ൌ ቀ׬ ௞ܲ,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻଵିఞ ௝݀ଵ଴ ቁ
భ
భషഖ 	,    ௪ܲ,௧௜ ൌ ቀ׬ ௪ܲ,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻଵିఞ ௝݀ଵ଴ ቁ
భ
భషഖ 	, 
where ௜ܲ,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ (respectively ௞ܲ,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ and ௪ܲ,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ) is the price of a typical variety ݆ produced in the home 
country (respectively imported prices from the RoU and the RoW). 
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The optimal demands for domestic, RoU and RoW goods, are derived from expenditure 
minimization4: 
௜ܺ,௧௜ ൌ 	 ൫1 െ ܽଵ௜ െ ܽଶ௜ ൯ ቆ ௜ܲ,௧
௜
௧ܲ௜
ቇ
ିఏ
ܺ௧௜																																																																																																												ሺ10ሻ	 
 ܺ௞,௧௜ ൌ 	 ܽଵ௜ ൬௉ೖ,೟
೔
௉೟೔ ൰
ିఏ
ܺ௧௜																																																																																																																																				ሺ11ሻ 
ܺ௪,௧௜ ൌ 	ܽଶ௜ ൬௉ೢ ,೟
೔
௉೟೔ ൰
ିఏ
ܺ௧௜																																																																																																																																			ሺ12ሻ  
  
2.2. Open-economy relations 
 
This section outlines the key relations that describe the terms of trade, the real exchange rates and the 
law of one price deviations. For each country ݅, ݇ ∈ 	 ሼ݄, ݂ሽ and ݅ ് ݇, we define the bilateral terms of 
trade as: 
ܱܶ ௞ܶ,௧௜ ൌ ௞ܲ,௧
௜
௜ܲ,௧௜
		ܽ݊݀		ܱܶ ௪ܶ,௧௜ ൌ ௪ܲ,௧
௜
௜ܲ,௧௜
																																																																																																								ሺ13ሻ 
From (9), the terms of trade can be related to the CPI-PPI ratio as follows: 
௧ܲ௜
௜ܲ,௧௜
ൌ ቂ൫1 െ ܽଵ௜ െ ܽଶ௜ ൯ ൅ ܽଵ௜ ൫ܱܶ ௞ܶ,௧௜ ൯ଵିఏ ൅ ܽଶ௜ ൫ܱܶ ௪ܶ,௧௜ ൯ଵିఏቃ
ଵ
ଵିఏ 																																																							ሺ14ሻ 
We assume that the law of one price (LOP) holds for the export sector, but there is incomplete pass-
through in the import sector. This assumption is motivated by the existence of monopolistic domestic 
importers in the union that practice local currency pricing (Devereux and Engel, 2001). This 
behaviour can make the price of the foreign goods in the domestic market temporarily deviate from 
the producer price level in the country of origin. The wedge between these two prices is called the 
law of one price gap (LOPG) and is given by, bilaterally:  
ܮܱܲܩ௞,௧௜ ൌ ௞ܲ,௧
௞
௞ܲ,௧௜
		ܽ݊݀		ܮܱܲܩ௪,௧௜ ൌ ܵ௧ ௪ܲ,௧
௪
௪ܲ,௧௜
																																																																																														ሺ15ሻ 
where ௞ܲ,௧௞  and ௪ܲ,௧௪  are domestic prices in country ݇ of the union and in the RoW. 
Similarly, we define the bilateral real exchange rates as follows: 
ܴܧܴ௞,௧௜ ൌ 	 ௧ܲ
௞
௧ܲ௜
	ܽ݊݀		ܴܧܴ௪,௧௜ ൌ ܵ௧ ௧ܲ
௪
௧ܲ௜
																																																																																																						ሺ16ሻ	 
                                                            
4 The optimization program is ݉݅݊஼೔,೟೔ ,	஼ೖ,೟೔ ,	஼ೢ,೟೔ ,஼೟೔ ௜ܲ,௧௜ ܥ௜,௧௜ ൅ ௞ܲ,௧௜ ܥ௞,௧௜ ൅ ௪ܲ,௧௜ ܥ௪,௧௜ ൌ ௧ܲ௜ܥ௧௜ subject to the following constraint: 
ܥ௧௜ ൌ 	 ቈሺ1 െ ܽଵ െ ܽଶሻ
భ
ഇ൫ܥ௜,௧௜ ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ ൅ ሺܽଵሻ
భ
ഇ൫ܥ௞,௧௜ ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ ൅ ሺܽଶሻ
భ
ഇ൫ܥ௪,௧௜ ൯
ഇషభ
ഇ ቉
ഇ
ഇషభ
. 
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Finally, we can express the effective terms of trade, the effective law of one price gap and the 
effective real exchange rate, for each country ݅ ∈ 	 ሼ݄, ݂ሽ  as: 
ܱܶ ௧ܶ௜ ൌ ൫ܱܶ ௞ܶ,௧௜ ൯௔భ
೔ ൫ܱܶ ௪ܶ,௧௜ ൯௔మ
೔ 																																																																																																														ሺ17ሻ 
ܮܱܲܩ௧௜ ൌ ൫ܮܱܲܩ௞,௧௜ ൯௔భ
೔ ൫	ܮܱܲܩ௪,௧௜ ൯௔మ
೔ 																																																																																																					ሺ18ሻ 
ܴܧܴ௧௜ ൌ ൫ܴܧܴ௞,௧௜ ൯௔భ
೔ ൫ܴܧܴ௪,௧௜ ൯௔మ
೔ 																																																																																																													ሺ19ሻ 
Assuming that the two countries ሼ݄, ݂ሽ are of the same size in the monetary union, the effective real 
exchange rate for the union is therefore:  
ܴܧܴ௧௨ ൌ ൫ܴܧܴ௧௛൯
ଵ
ଶ൫ܴܧܴ௧௙൯
ଵ
ଶ ൌ ൫ܴܧܴ௪,௧௛ ൯
௔మ೔ଶ ൫ܴܧܴ௪,௧௙ ൯
௔మ೔ଶ 																																																																			ሺ20ሻ 
which can be written also in terms of euro nominal exchange rate: 
ܴܧܴ௧௨ ൌ ܵ௧ ௧ܲ
௪
௧ܲ௨
																																																																																																																																												ሺ21ሻ 
where ௧ܲ௨ and ௧ܲ௪ are CPI of the monetary union and the rest of the world.5 
 
2.3. Production sector 
2.3.1. Entrepreneurs  
 
The entrepreneurs play an important role here because their presence allows us to introduce the 
financial accelerator mechanism. As in Bernanke et al. (1999), entrepreneurs manage a continuum of 
firms ݆ ∈ 	 ሾ0,1ሿ that produces, by using ܭ௧௜ units of capital and	 ௧ܰ௜ units of labour, wholesale 
(intermediate) goods in a perfectly competitive market according to the following technology: 
 
௧ܻ௜ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ܣ௧௜ܭ௧௜ሺ݆ሻఈ ௧ܰ௜ሺ݆ሻଵିఈ																																																																																																																						ሺ22ሻ 
where ܣ௧௜  is a technological shock that is common to all firms and follows a stationary first-order 
autoregressive process :	log൫ܣ௧௜ ൯ ൌ 	ߩ஺ log൫ܣ௧ିଵ௜ ൯ ൅ ஺݁,௧ , with	 ஺݁,௧~݅. ݅. ݀ሺ0, ߪ௘ಲଶ ሻ; ߙ	 ∈ 	 ሾ0,1ሿ  is the 
share of capital in the production technology.  
The representative firm maximizes its profit by choosing ܭ௧௜ and ௧ܰ௜ subject to the production 
function (22). The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are: 
ݓ௧௜ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݉ܿ௧௜ ௧ܻ
௜
௧ܰ௜
௜ܲ,௧௜
௧ܲ௜
																																																																																																																										ሺ23ሻ 
݉݌ܿ௧௜ ൌ 	ߙ	݉ܿ௧௜ ௧ܻ
௜
ܭ௧௜ 	
௜ܲ,௧௜
௧ܲ௜
																																																																																																																														ሺ24ሻ 
                                                            
5 The way we write the real effective exchange rate means that an increase in this variable denotes an effective real 
depreciation of the common currency with regard to the foreign currency (RoW).  
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where ݉ܿ௧௜ is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the production function (22) and denotes the 
real marginal cost; ݓ௧௜ is the real wage; and ݉݌ܿ௧௜ is the real marginal productivity of capital.  
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and borrow to finance a share of capital used in the production process. 
As in Bernanke et al. (1999), to ensure that they never accumulate enough funds to fully self-finance 
their own activities entirely, we assume that they have a finite expected horizon. In each period	ݐ, 
entrepreneurs face a constant probability ሺ1 െ ߥ	ሻ of leaving the economy. We follow Christensen 
and Dib (2008) in allowing newly entering entrepreneurs to inherit a fraction of the net worth of 
those firms which exit from the business. This assumption is made in order to ensure that new 
entrepreneurs start out with a positive net worth.6  
At the end of each period, entrepreneurs purchase capital,	ܭ௧ାଵ௜ , that will be used in the next period at 
the real price ݍ௧௜. Thus, the total funding needed by an entrepreneur to purchase capital is 	ݍ௧௜	ܭ௧ାଵ௜ . 
The capital acquisition is financed partly by their net worth,	ܰ ௧ܹାଵ௜ , and by borrowing, 
	ݍ௧௜	ܭ௧ାଵ௜ െ ܰ ௧ܹାଵ௜ , from a financial intermediary. Financial intermediaries (banks) obtain their funds 
from household deposits. Their activities are described below (see section 2.4.). 
In optimum, the entrepreneur’s aggregate demand for capital in the economy depends on the 
expected marginal return and the expected marginal financing cost at	ݐ ൅ 1. Thus, the capital demand 
must satisfy the following differentiation between the ex post marginal return on capital,	ܧ௧൫ܴ௄,௧ାଵ௜ ൯, 
and the marginal productivity of capital at ݐ ൅ 1, ݉݌ܿ௧௜, which is the rental rate of capital: 
ܧ௧൫ܴ௄,௧ାଵ௜ ൯ ൌ ܧ௧ ቈ൫1 െ ߬௄,௧
௜ ൯	݉݌ܿ௧ାଵ௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻݍ௧ାଵ௜
ݍ௧௜ ቉																																																																					ሺ25ሻ 
where ߜ is the capital depreciation rate, ߬௄,௧௜  is the tax rate on capital-income (whose introduction 
here is a specific feature of our model) and ሺ1 െ ߜሻݍ௧ାଵ௜  is the value of one unit of capital used in 
ݐ ൅ 1. 
Following Bernanke et al. (1999), we assume the existence of an agency problem that makes external 
finance more expensive than internal finance, because financial intermediaries  are facing costs for 
auditing the performance of entrepreneurs. However, entrepreneurs observe the random outcome of 
their investments costlessly and decide whether to repay their debt or to default. If they default, the 
lenders audit the project and seize whatever they find. As demonstrated in Bernanke et al. (1999), the 
optimal financial contract between borrower and lender implies an external finance premium (the 
difference between the cost of external and internal finance),	Ψ୉,௧௜ ሺ∙ሻ, that reflects the existence of 
auditing costs and depends on the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio (capital to net worth ratio). 
Accordingly, the entrepreneur’s demand for capital satisfies, optimally, the equality between 
expected return on capital and gross premium for external finance plus the gross real opportunity 
costs equivalent to the gross real interest rate on loans7: 
                                                            
6 In contrast, Bernanke et al. (1999) ensure this by assuming that entrepreneurs also work. This difference does not affect 
the results. 
7 For details, see Bernanke et al. (1999).  
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ܧ௧൫ܴ௄,௧ାଵ௜ ൯ ൌ ܧ௧ ቈΨ୉,௧ାଵ௜ ሺ∙ሻ ܴ௅,௧
௜
ߨ௧ାଵ௜ ቉																																																																																																											ሺ26ሻ 
where ܴ௅,௧௜  is the gross nominal interest rate on banks loans; Ψ୉,௧ାଵ௜ ሺ∙ሻ is the function that describes 
how  the external finance premium depends on the  financial position of the firm and is given by: 
Ψ୉,௧ାଵ௜ ሺ∙ሻ ൌ ൬ேௐ೟శభ
೔
௤೟೔௄೟శభ೔ ൰
ିఊ
with ቀΨ୉,௧ାଵ௜ ሺ∙ሻቁ
ᇱ ൏ 0 , Ψ୉௜ ሺ1ሻ ൌ 1 and ߛ is the elasticity of the external 
finance premium with respect to firm’s leverage ratio. Thus, the external finance premium is an 
equilibrium inverse function of the aggregate financial position in the economy, expressed by the 
leverage ratio. Equation (26) provides the basis for the financial accelerator. If entrepreneur’s net 
worth goes up, the external finance premium falls, the cost of borrowing falls and firms get cheaper 
access to credit.  
Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth accumulation of the economy depends on  profits earned in 
previous periods plus the bequest,	Ω௧௜ , that newly entering entrepreneurs receive from entrepreneurs 
who leave the economy, and evolves according to:  
ܰ ௧ܹାଵ௜ ൌ ߥ ቈܴ௄,௧௜ ݍ௧ିଵ௜ ܭ௧௜ െ ܴ௅,௧ିଵ
௜
ߨ௧௜ ቆ
ܰ ௧ܹ௜
ݍ௧ିଵ௜ ܭ௧௜ቇ
ିఊ
൫ݍ௧ିଵ௜ ܭ௧௜ െ ܰ ௧ܹ௜൯቉ ൅	ሺ1 െ ߥሻߗ௧௜																							ሺ27ሻ 
 
2.3.2. Capital producers  
 
Competitive capital producers use a linear technology to produce new capital ܭ௧ାଵ௜  from final 
investment goods ܫ௧௜ and existing capital stock leasing from entrepreneurs without costs. When 
producing capital, they are subject to quadratic capital adjustment costs specified as 
		ట಺ଶ ൬
ூ೟೔
௄೟೔ െ ߜ൰
ଶ
ܭ௧௜. 
The aggregate capital stock used by producers in each economy	݅ evolves as follow: 
ܭ௧ାଵ௜ ൌ ൥ ܫ௧
௜
ܭ௧௜ െ
߰ூ
2 ቆ
ܫ௧௜
ܭ௧௜ െ ߜቇ
ଶ
൩ܭ௧௜ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻܭ௧௜																																																																																				ሺ28ሻ 
where ߰ூ ൐ 0 is the parameter that measures the adjustment costs elasticity.  
Capital producers face an optimization problem which consists, in real terms, in choosing the level of 
investment that maximizes their profits:  
max
ூ೟೔
	 ൝ݍ௧௜ܫ௧௜ െ ܫ௧௜ െ ߰ூ2 ቆ
ܫ௧௜
ܭ௧௜ െ ߜቇ
ଶ
ܭ௧௜		ൡ 																																																																																																					ሺ29ሻ	 
The following equilibrium condition holds: 
ݍ௧௜ െ ߰ூ ቆ ܫ௧
௜
ܭ௧௜ െ ߜቇ ൌ 1																																																																																																																															ሺ30ሻ 
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which is the standard Tobin’s Q equation that links the price of capital to the marginal adjustment 
costs.  
When ߰ூ ൌ 0 (no adjustment costs), the capital price, ݍ௧௜	is constant and equal to 1. This shows that 
capital adjustment costs imply necessarily the capital price (ݍ௧௜) variation and therefore contribute to 
the volatility of entrepreneurial net worth. 
 
2.3.3. Retailers: price and inflation dynamics 
 
The existence of retailers provides the source of nominal stickiness in the economy. Retailers take 
wholesale goods as inputs, repackage these costlessly, and sell them in a monopolistically 
competitive market. There are domestic goods retailers and imported goods retailers. Following 
Calvo (1983), we assume that retailers set nominal prices on a staggered basis: at each period, a 
fraction ൫1 െ ߶௜൯ of retailers are randomly selected to set new prices while the remaining 
fraction	߶௜	of retailers keep their prices unchanged. For simplicity, these fractions are assumed to be 
equals within the two groups of retailers.  
All home goods retailers purchase the wholesale goods from entrepreneurs at a price equal to the 
entrepreneurs’ nominal marginal cost. Each retailer ݆ of them setting price at ݐ will choose the 
optimal price,	෩ܲ௜,௧௜  , that maximizes the expected profits for ݏ periods, so that: 
max
	௉෩೔,೟೔ ሺ௝ሻ
ܧ௧ ൝෍൫ߚ߶௜൯௦ ߣ௧ା௦
௜
ߣ௧௜ ൣ ௜ܻ,௧ା௦
௜ ሺ݆ሻ൫	෩ܲ௜,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ െ ௜ܲ,௧ା௦௜ ݉ܿ௧ା௦௜ ൯൧
ஶ
ୱୀ଴
ൡ																																																											ሺ31ሻ	 
subject to the demand function, 
௜ܻ,௧ା௦௜ ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ൬	௉
෩೔,೟శೞ೔ ሺ௝ሻ
௉೔,೟శೞ೔
൰
ିఞ
௜ܻ,௧ା௦௜ , where 
ఒ೟శೞ೔
ఒ೟೔
 is the households’ marginal utilities ratio between ݐ ൅ ݏ 
and		ݐ. 
The first-order condition for this problem yields, 
	෩ܲ௜,௧௜ ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ߯߯ െ 1
ܧ௧൛∑ ൫ߚ߶௜൯௦ߣ௧ା௦௜ ௜ܻ,௧ା௦௜ ሺ݆ሻ ௜ܲ,௧ା௦௜ ݉ܿ௧ା௦௜ஶ௦ୀ଴ ൟ	
ܧ௧൛∑ ሺߚ߶௜ሻ௦ߣ௧ା௦௜ ௜ܻ,௧ା௦௜ ሺ݆ሻஶ௦ୀ଴ ൟ
																																																														ሺ32ሻ 
 Aggregating across all retailers, the price index for domestically produced goods is given by, 
௜ܲ,௧௜ ൌ ቂ൫1 െ ߶௜൯൫	෩ܲ௜,௧௜ ൯ଵିఞ ൅ ߶௜൫ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ௜ ൯ଵିఞቃ
ଵ
ଵିఞ 																																																																																	ሺ33ሻ 
Combining log-linearized versions of equations (32) and (33) yields an expression of the inflation 
rate for domestically produced goods, defined by the following New Keynesian Phillips curve: 
ߨො௜,௧௜ ൌ ߚܧ௧ߨො௜,௧ାଵ௜ ൅
൫1 െ ߶௜൯൫1 െ ߚ߶௜൯
߶௜ ݉ෞܿ ௧
௜																																																																																									ሺ34ሻ 
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where ݉ܿ௧௜ is the real marginal cost, ߨ௜,௧௜ ൌ ሺ ௉೔,೟
೔
௉೔,೟షభ೔
ሻ is domestic inflation and variables with hats are 
log deviations from their steady-state values. 
Similarly, imported goods retailers purchase the products from foreign producers at the wholesale 
price, ܲீ ,௧௜ . At the wholesale level, the law of one price holds. Thus, ܲீ ,௧௜ ൌ ௞ܲ,௧௞  and ܲீ ,௧௜ ൌ ܵ௧ ௪ܲ,௧௪  are 
the wholesale prices (nominal marginal costs) for goods coming from the RoU and the RoW, 
respectively. But at the retail level, we assume that the law of one price does not hold (such as 
௞ܲ,௧௜ ് ௞ܲ,௧௞  and ௪ܲ,௧௜ ് ܵ௧ ௪ܲ,௧௪ ). There is, thus, incomplete exchange rate pass-through in the model. 
Similar to the home good retailers, imported goods retailers set prices according to a Calvo-style 
price setting equation. Their optimization problems are identical except for real marginal costs. The 
latter are, respectively, ሺ௉ೖ,೟ೖ௉ೖ,೟೔ ሻ ≡ ܮܱܲܩ௞,௧
௜  and  ሺௌ೟௉ೢ ,೟ೢ௉ೢ ,೟೔ ሻ ≡ ܮܱܲܩ௪,௧
௜  for imported goods from the RoU 
and the RoW. The inflation rates for imported goods then satisfy these following New Keynesian 
Phillips curves: 
ߨො௞,௧௜ ൌ ߚܧ௧ߨො௞,௧ାଵ௜ ൅ ൫1 െ ߶
௜൯൫1 െ ߚ߶௜൯
߶௜ ݈݋݌෣݃௞,௧
௜ 																																																																																	ሺ35ሻ 
ߨො௪,௧௜ ൌ ߚܧ௧ߨො௪,௧ାଵ௜ ൅ ൫1 െ ߶
௜൯൫1 െ ߚ߶௜൯
߶௜ ݈݋݌෣݃௪,௧
௜ 																																																																															ሺ36ሻ 
where ߨ௞,௧௜  and ߨ௪,௧௜  are imported inflation prices from the RoU and the RoW. 
Finally, from equation (9), CPI inflation,	ߨො௧௜	, is a composite of domestic, foreign and world goods 
prices inflation, such that: 
ߨො௧௜ ൌ ൫1 െ ܽଵ௜ െ ܽଶ௜ ൯ߨො௜,௧௜ ൅ ܽଵ௜ ߨො௞,௧௜ ൅ ܽଶ௜ ߨො௪,௧௜ 																																																																																											ሺ37ሻ	 
∀	݅, ݇ ∈ 	 ሼ݄, ݂ሽ and 	݅ ് ݇. 
 
2.4. Banks 
 
Competitive banks make financial intermediation. The purpose of financial intermediary in the model 
is to allow fiscal and monetary policies to influence the economy via the bank-lending channel. At 
the beginning of each period ݐ, the representative bank takes deposits, ܦ௧௜, from the representative 
household and lends to domestic entrepreneurs, domestic government and foreign government (in the 
RoU). Bank loans are defined by ܮ௧௜  and assumed to take the following form: 
ܮ௧௜ ൌ Ԫ௧௜ܦ௧௜																																																																																																																																																					ሺ38ሻ 
where Ԫ௧௜ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ denotes the fraction of total deposits lent out to entrepreneurs and governments of 
the monetary union. The remaining portion of deposits,	ሺ1 െ Ԫ௧௜ ሻ, is held as reserves that earn no 
interest. Following Atta-Mensah and Dib (2008), we assume that the intermediation process Ԫ௧௜  is 
partly endogenous and depends on the state of the economy in this way:  
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Ԫ௧௜ ൌ ቆ ௧ܻ
௜
ܻ௜ቇ
ఢ
ܼఢ,௧௜ 																																																																																																																																												ሺ39ሻ	 
The parameter ߳ is the elasticity of the willingness to lend with respect to changes in economic 
activity (deviations of output from its steady-state value) and ܼఢ,௧௜  represents shocks to the 
intermediation process. If the willingness to lend is pro-cyclical, then  ߳ ൐ 0. This can be justified by 
the fact that, in good times, net worth of entrepreneurs and governments’ fiscal receipts are relatively 
high. This improves the credit risks of borrowers and increases the willingness of financial 
intermediaries to lend. The process for  ܼఢ,௧௜  is given by: 
log൫ܼఢ,௧௜ ൯ ൌ 	ߩఢ log൫ܼఢ,௧ିଵ௜ ൯ ൅ ݁ఢ,௧																																																																																																									ሺ40ሻ 
The shock ܼఢ,௧௜  could represent, for example, an exogenous change in the confidence level of bank 
with respect to the credit risks of their borrowers and the health of the economy8. 
Next, we assume that banks provide the fixed shares of their loans to entrepreneurs, foreign 
government and domestic government. These shares are, respectively,ߞா௜  , ߞ௞௜  and ሺ1 െ ߞ௞௜ െ ߞா௜ ሻ. At 
the end of period	ݐ, the representative bank receives, in principal and interest, ܴ௅,௧௜ Ψ୉,௧௜ ሺ∙ሻሺߞா௜ ܮ௧௜ ሻ from 
entrepreneurs, ܴ௅,௧௜ Ψ௟,௧௞ ൫݈௧௜ , ݈௧௞, ܼ௟,௧௞ ൯ሺߞ௞௜ ܮ௧௜ ሻ from foreign government in the RoU and ܴ௅,௧௜ ሺ1 െ ߞ௞௜ െ
ߞா௜ ሻܮ௧௜  from domestic government. We assumed that domestic government loan cost is the benchmark 
for banks to decide which costs must be applied on the others agents’ loans. Therefore, banks provide 
loans in a way consistent with a portfolio management goal (changing the cost of borrowing of each 
agent), and the variable ܴ௅,௧௜  is the gross nominal interest rate on domestic government loans.  
The relative risk premia are defined as follows: Ψ୉,௧௜ ሺ∙ሻ is entrepreneur’s external finance premium as 
previously defined and Ψ௟,௧௞ ൫݈௧௜ , ݈௧௞, ܼ௟,௧௞ ൯, defined in section 2.5 below, is the relative risk premium paid 
by government ݇. Banks owe ܴ௧ܦ௧௜ to depositors and earn a zero net return on their reserves. In this 
case, the bank profit function is given by:  
Π௟,௧௜ ൌ ܴ௅,௧௜ ሺ1 െ ߞ௞௜ െ ߞா௜ ሻܮ௧௜ ൅ ܴ௅,௧௜ Ψ௟,௧௞ ߞ௞௜ ܮ௧௜ ൅ ܴ௅,௧௜ Ψ୉,୲௜ ሺ∙ሻߞா௜ ܮ௧௜ ൅ ܦ௧௜ െ ܴ௧ܦ௧௜ െ ሺ1 െ ߞ௞௜ െ ߞா௜ ሻܮ௧௜ െ
													ߞ௞௜ ܮ௧௜ െ ߞா௜ ܮ௧௜ 																																																																																																																																									ሺ41ሻ   
 
Given the competition among banks for loans and deposits, the zero profit condition guarantees that: 
ܴ௅,௧௜ ൌ ܴ௧ െ 1 ൅ Ԫ௧
௜
ൣ1 ൅ ߞ௞௜ ሺΨ௟,௧௞ െ 1ሻ ൅ ߞா௜ ሺΨ୉,୲௜ െ 1ሻ൧Ԫ௧௜
																																																																																									ሺ42ሻ 
The fluctuations in the reserve levels of banks are captured by the parameter epsilon and would be 
reflected in the gap between loan and deposit interest rates. Equation (42) shows that the loans 
interest rate applied to domestic government decreases when risk premia of relative risky agents 
increases, and thus when their debts increase. 
 
                                                            
8 The other possible sources of variation in ܼఢ,௧௜  are: perceived changes in entrepreneur’s cash flow or net worth, 
government regulation of banks, technological advances in the intermediation process (Berger, 2003). 
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2.5. Government Budget Constraint and Fiscal policy  
 
In each economy, government spends in purchases of aggregate goods ܩ௧௜ and transfers to 
households	ܴܶ௧௜ . To do that, the government collects tax revenues on consumption and capital 
income, and receives loans from domestic and foreign banks (ሺ1 െ ߞ௞௜ െ ߞா௜ ሻܮ௧௜  and ߞ௜௞ܮ௧௞ 
respectively).  
 
The government budget constraint is given by:  
ሺ1 െ ߞ௞௜ െ ߞா௜ ሻܮ௧௜ ൅ ߞ௜௞ܮ௧௞ ൌ ܴ௅,௧ିଵ௜ ሺ1 െ ߞ௞௜ െ ߞா௜ ሻܮ௧ିଵ௜ ൅ ܴ௅,௧ିଵ௜ Ψ௟,௧௜ ൫݈௧௜ , ݈௧௞, ܼ௟,௧௜ ൯൫ߞ௜௞ܮ௧ିଵ௞ ൯ ൅ ܲܦ௧௜		ሺ43ሻ  
In equation (43), ܲܦ௧௜ is the nominal primary deficit and expressed by:  
ܲܦ௧௜ ൌ ௧ܲ௜ܩ௧௜ ൅ ܴܶ௧௜ െ ߬௖,௧௜ ௧ܲ௜ܥ௧௜ െ ߬௄,௧௜ ݉݌ܿ௧௜ܭ௧௜ ௧ܲ௜																																																																																ሺ44ሻ		 
The term Ψ௟,௧௜ ൫݈௧௜ , ݈௧௞, ܼ௟,௧௜ ൯ is the government ݅’ relative risk premium such that,  
Ψ௟,௧௜ ൫݈௧௜ , ݈௧௞, ܼ௟,௧௜ ൯ ≡ ݁ݔ݌ ቆ	߰௟௜ ቆ൫1 െ ߞ௞
௜ െ ߞா௜ ൯ܮ௧௜ ൅ ߞ௜௞ܮ௧௞
ܻ௜ ௧ܲ௜ ቇ ൅ ܼ௟,௧
௜ ቇ																																																								ሺ45ሻ	 
where  ߰௟௜ is the elasticity of the risk premium with respect to government debt; ݈௧௜ ≡ ௅೟
೔
௒೔௉೟೔
 and  
݈௧௞ ≡ ௅೟
ೖ
௒ೖ௉೟ೖ are respectively the total of loans made by banks in economy ݅ and  ݇; ܼ௟,௧
௜  is an exogenous 
shock on government’s premium and evolves according to the following autoregressive process: 
log൫ܼ௟,௧௜ ൯ ൌ ߩ௟ log൫ܼ௟,௧ିଵ௜ ൯ ൅	݁௟,௧																																																																																																															ሺ46ሻ 
 
Fiscal policy instruments 
 
The government needs to adjust tax revenues or expenditure to stabilize its deficit and debt. We 
choose public spending as the fiscal policy instrument. Government spending adjustments in 
response to cyclical fluctuations are endogenously made according to the fiscal rule:  
log ቆܩ௧
௜
ܩ௜ቇ ൌ ߩ௚log ቆ
ܩ௧ିଵ௜
ܩ௜ ቇ െ ሺܿ݃ሻ൫1 െ ߩ௚൯ߩ௚௬log ቆ
௧ܻ௜
ܻ௜ቇ െ ൫1 െ ߩ௚൯ߩ௚௟log ቆ
ܦ ௧ܻ௜
ܦܻ௜ቇ ൅ ௚݁,௧								ሺ47ሻ 
where ߩ௚, ߩ௚௬, ߩ௚௟ ∈ 	 ሾ0,1ሿ capture, respectively, the degree of public spending smoothing, fiscal 
reaction to output deviation and fiscal reaction to debt/GDP ratio (ܦ ௧ܻ௜ ≡ ቀଵି఍ೖ
೔ ି఍ಶ೔ ቁ௅೟೔ା఍೔ೖ௅೟ೖ
௒೔௉೟೔ ); ௚݁,௧ is an 
exogenous shock to government spending ( ௚݁,௧~	݅. ݅. ݀. ቀ0, ߪ௘೒ଶ ቁ).  
 
The parameter ሺܿ݃ሻ captures the degree of fiscal policy cyclicality. If  ሺܿ݃ሻ ൌ 1 (resp.	ሺܿ݃ሻ ൌ െ1), 
public spending is counter-cyclical (resp. pro-cyclical).  
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As for the other fiscal instruments, government transfers, taxes on consumption and capital income 
follow an autoregressive process: 
log ቆܴܶ௧
௜
ܴܶ௜ቇ ൌ ߩ௧௥ log ቆ
ܴܶ௧ିଵ௜
ܴܶ௜ ቇ ൅	݁௧௥,௧																																																																																																								ሺ48ሻ			 
log ቆ߬௖,௧
௜
߬௖௜ ቇ ൌ ߩఛ௖ log ቆ
߬௖,௧௜
߬௖௜ ቇ ൅	݁ఛ௖,௧																																																																																																												ሺ49ሻ	 
log ቆ߬௄,௧
௜
߬௄௜ ቇ ൌ ߩఛ௄ log ቆ
߬௄,௧௜
߬௄௜ ቇ ൅	݁ఛ௄,௧																																																																																																								ሺ50ሻ 
where, ߩ௫ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, with ݔ ൌ ݐݎ, ߬ܿ	and	߬ܭ, are the coefficients of the autoregressive process and 
	݁௫,௧~݅. ݅. ݀ሺ0, ߪ௘ೣଶ ሻ are the associated exogenous shocks.  
 
2.6. Monetary authority  
 
In the monetary union, the common central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to the 
following Taylor-type interest rate rule: 
log ൬ܴ௧ܴ ൰ ൌ ߚ଴log ൬
ܴ௧ିଵ
ܴ ൰ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߚ଴ሻ ቈߚଵlog ቆ
ܧ௧ߨ௧ାଵ௨௠
ߨ௨௠ ቇ ൅ ߚଶlog ቆ
௧ܻ௨௠
ܻ௨௠ቇ቉ ൅ ݁௥,௧																																ሺ51ሻ	 
with ݁௥,௧~	݅. ݅. ݀. ൫0, ߪ௘ೝଶ ൯. 
ܴ, ߨ௨௠ and ܻ௨௠ are the steady-state values of		ܴ௧, ߨ௧௨௠ and ௧ܻ௨௠, that are, respectively, the nominal 
interest rate, the inflation rate and output of the union. The variables ߨ௧௨௠ and ௧ܻ௨௠ are the average 
values of inflation and output of the two equal-size countries:  
ߨ௧௨௠ ൌ 12 ൫ߨ௧
௛ ൅ ߨ௧௙൯		and		 ௧ܻ௨௠ ൌ
1
2 ൫ ௧ܻ
௛ ൅ ௧ܻ௙൯																																																																																						ሺ52ሻ 
ߚଵ ൐ 1 and ߚଶ ൏ 1 are coefficients that measure central bank responses to expected inflation and 
output deviations. The parameter 0 ൏ ߚ଴ ൏ 1 captures the degree of interest rate smoothing.  
 
2.7. General equilibrium conditions  
 
In equilibrium, the factor markets, the final goods market, the loan market and the international 
traded bonds market must clear in each country	݅ ∈ 	 ሼ݄, ݂ሽ. 
Equilibrium in factor markets requires: 
														 ௧ܰ	௜ ൌ න ௧ܰ௜ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ଵ
଴
	and		ܭ௧	௜ ൌ නܭ௧௜ሺ݆ሻ݆݀
ଵ
଴
																																																																																			ሺ53ሻ	 
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The loan market clears when the unused fraction of household deposits in reserves by financial 
intermediaries equalizes the total funds lent to entrepreneurs, domestic government and government 
in the RoU (see equation 38 supra).   
Let ௧ܻ௜ ≡ ൬׬ ௧ܻ௜ሺ݆ሻ
ഖషభ
ഖ ௝݀
ଵ
଴ ൰
ഖ
ഖషభ
 denote aggregate output. Thus, the goods market clearing condition 
satisfies:  
௧ܻ௜ ൌ ܥ௜,௧௜ ൅ ܫ௜,௧௜ ൅ ܩ௜,௧௜ ൅ ܧܺ௧௜																																																																																																																				ሺ54ሻ 
where ܧܺ௧௜ ൌ ܽଵ௜ ൬௉೔,೟
೔
௉೟ೖ൰
ିఏ
ܣܤ௧௞ ൅	ܽଶ௜ ൬ ௉೔,೟
೔
ௌ೟௉೟ೢ ൰
ିఏ
ܣܤ௧௪	 
The variable EX represents total exports and AB stands for absorption.  
Then the domestic economy’s aggregate resource constraint can be rewritten as:  
௧ܻ௜ ൌ ቆ ௜ܲ,௧
௜
௧ܲ௜
ቇ
ିఏ
൥൫1 െ ܽଵ௜ െ ܽଶ௜ ൯ܣܤ௧௜ ൅ ܽଵ௜ ቆ 1ܴܧܴ௞,௧௜
ቇ
ିఏ
ܣܤ௧௞ ൅ ܽଶ௜ ቆ 1ܴܧܴ௪,௧௜ ቇ
ିఏ
ܣܤ௧௪൩															ሺ55ሻ 
where	ܣܤ௧௜, ܣܤ௧௞ and ܣܤ௧௪ are, respectively, absorption in the domestic economy, RoU and the RoW. 
We have:  
ܣܤ௧௜ ൌ ܥ௧௜ ൅ ܫ௧௜ ൅ ܩ௧௜																																																																																																																																					ሺ56ሻ 
ܣܤ௧௞ ൌ ܥ௧௞ ൅ ܫ௧௞ ൅ ܩ௧௞																																																																																																																																		ሺ57ሻ 
   and  ܣܤ௧௪ is an exogenous process.  
The internationally traded bonds market is in equilibrium when the positions of the export and 
importing firms vis-à-vis the RoW equals the households’ choice of internationally traded bonds 
holdings. The evolution of net foreign assets (government assets holdings from the RoU plus 
households internationally traded bonds holdings) at the aggregate level can be expressed as: 
ܵ௧ܤ௪,௧௜ ൅ ߞ௜௞ܮ௧௞ ൌ ܵ௧ܴ௪,௧ିଵΨ௕,௧ିଵ௜ ൫ܾ௧ିଵ௜ , ܼ௧ିଵ௜ ൯ܤ௪,௧ିଵ௜ ൅ ܴ௅,௧ିଵ௜ Ψ௟,௧ିଵ௜ ൫݈௧ିଵ௜ , ݈௧ିଵ௞ , ܼ௟,௧ିଵ௜ ൯ߞ௜௞ܮ௧ିଵ௞ ൅ ܧܺ௧௜
െ ሺܫܯ௞,௧௜ ൅ ܫܯ௪,௧௜ ሻ																																																																																																															ሺ58ሻ	 
where ܫܯ௞,௧௜  and ܫܯ௪,௧௜  are imports of country ݅ originating from country ݇ (of the RoU) and from the 
RoW, respectively. 
Noting that the definitions of ܾ௧௜ , ݈௧௜  and ݈௧௞ are ܾ௧௜ ≡ ௌ೟஻ೢ,೟
೔
௒௉೟೔ , ݈௧
௜ ≡ ௅೟೔௒೔௉೟೔ and  ݈௧
௞ ≡ ௅೟ೖ௒ೖ௉೟ೖ, we can write the 
evolution of total real NFA position in percentage of steady-state output as:  
 ܾ௧௜ ൅ ߞ௜௞݈௧௞ ௉೟
ೖ
௉೟೔ ൌ
ோೢ,೟షభஏ್,೟షభ೔
గ೟೔ ܾ௧ିଵ
௜ ൅ ோಽ,೟షభ೔ ஏ೗,೟షభ೔గ೟೔ ߞ௜
௞݈௧ିଵ௞ ௉೟షభ
ೖ
௉೟షభ೔ ൅ 	
ଵ
௒ ൬
௉೔,೟೔
௉೟೔ ௧ܻ
௜ െ ܥ௧௜ െ ܫ௧௜ െ ܩ௧௜൰																	ሺ59ሻ 
∀	݅, ݇ ∈ 	 ሼ݄, ݂ሽ and 	݅ ് ݇. 
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2.8. Rest of the world  
 
We assume that the RoW is fully exogenous and its variables follow an autoregressive process such 
that:  
logሺܣܤ௧௪ሻ ൌ 	ߩ஺஻௪ logሺܣܤ௧ିଵ௪ ሻ ൅ ஺݁௪,௧																																																																																																				ሺ60ሻ 
log൫ܴ௪,௧൯ ൌ 	ߩோ௪ log൫ܴ௪,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ݁௥௪,௧																																																																																																				ሺ61ሻ 
log൫ߨ௪,௧൯ ൌ 	ߩగ௪ log൫ߨ௪,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ݁గ௪,௧																																																																																																				ሺ62ሻ 
where ߩ௫ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ with ݔ ൌ ܣܤݓ, ܴݓ	and	ߨݓ are the coefficients of autoregressive process and 
	݁௫,௧~݅. ݅. ݀ሺ0, ߪ௘ೣଶ ሻ are the associated exogenous shocks.  
 
 
3. Calibration of the model and simulations of real and financial shocks 
 
3.1 Calibration of the model 
 
We log-linearized the equations of the model around the steady state.9 We then used the software 
Dynare to do the simulations. The calibration of the model and the main macroeconomic steady-state 
ratios are summarized in Table 1 below. Calibration is made according to the references found in the 
literature for the euro area (on average) or according to our own computation based on the ECB, 
OECD and European Commission (AMECO) databases.  
We simulate two types of asymmetric shocks hitting the domestic country: 1) a positive 
technological shock and 2) a default risk premium shock. For both shocks, we study the effects on the 
domestic economy and the spillover effects on the economy of the partner country (RoU). In 
particular, special attention is given to two mechanisms: the evolution and financing of public debt 
and the impact of the openness of the union toward the RoW. We consider first a technological shock 
because we want to generate higher economic growth in one country of the monetary union and study 
the consequences of a pro-cyclical stance of fiscal policy in the domestic country. Thus, we compare 
two opposite cases concerning the behaviour of public spending in response to the output gap in the 
domestic country: it is either counter-cyclical (the parameter cg is equal to 1) or pro-cyclical (cg = 
1). In contrast, public spending remains countercyclical in the RoU in all cases. As for the default 
risk premium shock, we think of it as a case where one country of the monetary union is faced with a 
sudden change in expectations of the financial markets about the sovereign debt sustainability 
(assuming that the domestic country has a pro-cyclical fiscal policy). In addition, we assume that the 
elasticity of the sovereign risk premium to the level of public debt is higher in both countries of the 
monetary union ( il  = 0.1 instead of 0.01). This assumption relies on the idea that traders of 
government bonds in financial markets will react to any change in the level of public indebtedness 
more than they used to and whatever the country.  
 
                                                            
9 The linearized version of the model is available upon request. 
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Table 1.  Baseline calibration of the DSGE model 
Description Parameter Value References 
Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution   2 Literature on the EA 
Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply  1 Literature on the EA 
Subjective discount factor   0.99 Literature on the EA 
Habit persistence coefficient h 0.85 Literature on the EA 
Share of imported goods from the rest of the union ia1  0.21 AMECO database 
Share of imported goods from the rest of the world ia2  0.11 AMECO database 
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods   1.5 Coenen et al. (2008) 
Elasticity of the risk premium with respect to NFA position ib  0.001 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) 
Capital contribution to production   0.36 OECD database 
Capital depreciation rate   0.025 Literature on the EA 
Internal capital adjustment costs parameter I  0.25 Literature on the EA 
Fraction of retailers keeping their prices unchanged i  0.8 Literature on the EA 
Elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to firm’s 
leverage ratio 
  1 Literature on the EA 
Firms’ probability of leaving the economy 1 0.272 Bernanke et al. (1999) 
Share of banking loans to firms iE 0.65 ECB database 
Share of banking loans to foreign government (in the RoU) ik  0.195 ECB database 
Elasticity of risk premium with respect to government debt il  0.01/0.1 Simulations 
Elasticity of the willingness to lend with respect to changes in 
economic activity    1.82 ECB database 
Steady State Macroeconomic Ratios 
Capital / GDP ratio YK /  8 AMECO database 
Consumption/GDP ratio YC /  0.6 AMECO database 
Investment /GDP ratio YI /  0.2 AMECO database 
Public expenditures/GDP ratio YG /  0.2 AMECO database 
Transfers/GDP ratio YTr /  0.13 AMECO database 
Monetary and fiscal policy 
Smoothing coefficient in the monetary rule 0 0.8 Literature on the EA 
Inflation stabilizing coefficient in the monetary rule 1   2 Literature on the EA 
Output stabilizing coefficient in the monetary rule 2   0.1 Literature on the EA 
Smoothing coefficient in the public expenditure rule g  0.8 Coenen et al. (2008) 
Output stabilizing coefficient in the public expenditure  rule gy   0.3 Christoffel et al. (2011) 
Debt stabilizing coefficient in the public expenditure  rule gl   0.01 Christoffel et al. (2011) 
Tax rate on consumption c  0.20 EC data 
Tax rate on capital income k   0.25 EC data 
Shocks    
Coefficients of autoregressive process for technology a 0.6  
Coefficients of autoregressive process for shock on government’s 
premium l  0.5  
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3.2 Technological shock analysis 
 
Figure 1 displays the effects of a positive technological shock in the domestic country on the 
domestic economy. The spillover effects on the RoU are displayed in Figure 2. We have the usual 
impact of a positive technological shock: higher output, higher investment, higher consumption and 
lower inflation compared to the steady-state level in the domestic country. As a consequence, the 
latter becomes more competitive within the union and with regard to the RoW (real effective 
depreciation of domestic goods relative to foreign goods). The common central bank lowers the 
common short-term nominal interest rate less than the fall in the average rate of inflation in the union 
(the average output gap in the union is positive). As a result, the real interest rate is positive in both 
countries. Since the rental rate of capital decreases much in the domestic economy (given the decline 
in the marginal productivity of capital), the domestic government collects fewer tax receipts on 
capital income. This negative effect on the government revenues is greater than the positive effect of 
higher receipts from the tax on consumption.   
In the case of a counter-cyclical fiscal rule, public consumption is lower. Nevertheless, the ratio of 
public debt to GDP rises because the decline in total tax revenues is larger than the decline in primary 
public expenditures. In the pro-cyclical fiscal policy scenario, public consumption increases and the 
increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is less strong than in the counter-cyclical case in the short 
term, because output is higher in the pro-cyclical case. In the latter case, the nominal effective 
depreciation of the common currency is stronger (in order to get the balance of payments back to 
equilibrium). And a stronger real effective depreciation leads to more exports of goods to the RoW. 
Yet, in the long term, the ratio of public debt to GDP goes back to its steady-state level much faster 
in the counter-cyclical case than in the pro-cyclical case.  
Initially, the interest rate on public bonds is lower because the effect of a lower key interest rate (set 
by the central bank) is stronger than the effect of a higher sovereign risk premium. After the initial 
impact of the shock, the interest rate on public bonds increases more in the counter-cyclical case than 
in the pro-cyclical case, because the ratio of public debt to GDP is higher in the former case (given a 
lower output gap). As for the cost of borrowing for the private sector, it is lower at the moment of the 
shock. Banks set the interest rate on loans to the private sector by adding an external finance 
premium to a reference rate (that is the interest rate on public bond). Apart from the lower reference 
rate (at the beginning), firms enjoy a lower risk premium because they are perceived relatively less 
risky than governments (whose indebtedness is increasing).  
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Figure 1. Technological shock and fiscal policy: effects on domestic country 
 
 
 
For the partner country in the RoU, a pro-cyclical stance of fiscal policy in the domestic country 
amplifies negative spillover effects on consumption and investment (figure 2). Private consumption 
and investment fall more because the real interest rate is higher than in the case where the domestic 
country implements a counter-cyclical fiscal policy. This is due to a stronger fall in prices 
(accentuated by lower imported inflation). Moreover, the central bank does not lower sufficiently the 
common nominal interest rate (given that it is set according to average values of the economic 
variables of the member countries). Yet, output can increase in the RoU as long as exports of goods 
towards the RoW can increase. As a matter of fact, for the RoU, there is a real appreciation of goods 
with regard to the domestic country but there is also a real depreciation of goods with regard to the 
RoW (given the nominal depreciation of the common currency). This effect on exports to the RoW 
more than offsets the negative direct spillover effects on consumption and investment. Higher exports 
of goods to the RoW imply that there is a need to produce more with the same amount of capital. A 
higher productivity of capital translates into a higher rental rate of capital.  
The RoU benefits from an increase in fiscal revenues from taxes on capital income. Public 
consumption decreases more in the case of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the domestic country than in 
the case of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy, because output in the RoU is (slightly) higher in the 
former case (public consumption is counter-cyclical in the RoU). As a consequence, public debt 
decreases in the RoU and the sovereign risk premium decreases too. During the process of going 
back to the long-term equilibrium, the RoU is faced with a fall in the effective real exchange rate (a 
real appreciation), a decrease in exports of goods towards the RoW, a decrease in output, an increase 
in public primary expenditures, an increase in consumption tax receipts but a decrease in capital 
 
 
22 
 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
 Output gap 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
 Investment 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
 Consumption 
0 5 10 15 20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
x 10-3  Public consumption 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
 Inflation 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
 Rental rate of capital 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
 Real interest rate 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
 Effective real exchange rate 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
 Interest rate for domestic government bonds 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
 External finance premium for firms 
0 5 10 15 20
-4
-2
0
2
x 10-4 Default risk premium 
0 5 10 15 20
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
 Public debt/GDP 
 
 
counter-cyclical fiscal scenario pro-cyclical fiscal scenario
income tax receipts, and an increase in public debt (back to the steady-state level). There will be an 
increase in the interest rate on public bonds and firms can enjoy a relatively lower cost of borrowing, 
if the fall in the external finance premium (they are perceived relatively less risky than governments) 
can compensate for the rise in the reference rate (interest rate on public bonds). 
 
Figure 2. Technological shock and fiscal policy: effects on the RoU 
 
 
Note: fiscal policy is either counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical in the domestic country hit by the technological shock. But it 
is always counter-cyclical in the RoU. 
 
All in all, the model shows that the real interest rate is a key variable in causing macroeconomic 
divergences between countries of the monetary union while the (extra-union) real exchange rate 
lessens these divergences. Pro-cyclical public primary expenditures in the domestic country, where 
higher output growth is generated by a positive technological shock, accentuate the negative spillover 
effects on consumption and investment in the partner country (RoU). In the domestic country, the 
ratio of public debt to GDP increases less in the short-term than in the case of a counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy, because pro-cyclical public spending amplifies output growth. However, it takes far 
more time to get the public debt/GDP ratio back to its steady-state level. Some governments may 
tend to neglect the long-term effects of their pro-cyclical fiscal policy. The rise in the domestic public 
debt makes the private sectors in the domestic economy and in the RoU relatively less risky. As a 
consequence, there are some positive financial effects for private agents, at least in the short-term. As 
regards the public sector in the RoU, there are lower costs of borrowing but only in the very short-
term.    
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3.3 Sovereign risk premium analysis  
 
The domestic country is now hit by a financial shock: a higher sovereign risk premium. Figure 3 
depicts the effects on the domestic economy (straight line) and on the RoU (dotted line) in the case 
where fiscal policy is pro-cyclical in the domestic country but counter-cyclical in the RoU. This 
shock makes the government of domestic country relatively riskier than the government in the RoU. 
As a consequence, the optimal behaviour of banks implies a higher interest rate on domestic 
sovereign bonds and a lower interest rate on foreign sovereign bonds. As regards the private sector, 
the cost of borrowing hardly changes in the domestic economy because the higher reference rate 
(interest rate on public bonds) is almost matched by a lower external finance premium. In the RoU, 
the cost of borrowing for private sector declines a bit because the fall in the interest rate on public 
bonds is slightly larger than the increase in the external finance premium (the private sector being 
perceived by banks as relatively riskier than the public sector in the RoU). Thus, the higher sovereign 
risk premium in the domestic country lowers the cost of borrowing in the RoU. Consequently, in the 
RoU, there is an increase in investment, output and inflation. The fall in the real interest rate leads to 
higher consumption (the latter gives rise to imports of foreign goods). The domestic economy can 
grow thanks to exports of goods to the RoU and to the RoW (with a nominal depreciation of the 
common currency). 
 
Figure 3. Impact of an asymmetric risk premium shock 
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Public consumption decreases in the RoU since it is counter-cyclical and it increases in the domestic 
country where fiscal spending is pro-cyclical. The foreign government in the RoU benefits from 
higher tax receipts (both from consumption tax and capital income tax) and lower interest payments. 
Public debt decreases. In the domestic country, the public debt-to-GDP ratio decreases a bit, despite 
the shock on the default risk premium. As a matter of fact, the rise in output is due to higher exports 
and leads to a higher rental rate of capital. The domestic government collects more tax receipts from 
the tax on capital income. 
All in all, the negative impact of the shock on the risk premium on the domestic country is 
counteracted by a credit channel and a trade channel: as long as the cost of borrowing decreases in 
the RoU for the public sector and the private sector, higher output growth in the RoU can help the 
domestic economy to grow faster via intra-union trade. Moreover, the effective real depreciation of 
the common currency can boost exports towards the RoW. Unfortunately, in the context of the 
financial crisis and the euro area crisis, world growth was slow and some European countries found it 
difficult to export more to the rest of the world. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we studied international macroeconomic divergences in a DSGE model of two 
countries belonging to a monetary union which is open to the rest of the world. We put the focus on 
divergences in the cyclical stance of national fiscal policies, which may be pro-cyclical in one 
country and counter-cyclical in the other country. We simulated two asymmetric shocks hitting the 
domestic country: a positive technological shock and a negative shock on the default risk premium. 
The model allowed us to explain the spillover effects of these shocks on the economy of the other 
country in the rest of the union (RoU). We highlighted the role of the evolution of public debt and of 
the sovereign risk premium in the cost of borrowing for the public sector in the RoU and for the 
private sectors in the domestic economy and in the RoU. There is also the critical role of external 
trade with the rest of the world (RoW): an effective real depreciation of the currency of the monetary 
union which gives rise to exports to the RoW can compensate for the negative effects of a higher real 
interest rate on consumption and investment within the monetary union.      
Under the technological shock, we found that the pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the domestic country 
leads to a lower increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio over the short-term than in the counter-
cyclical case because output growth is higher in the former case. However, the public debt remains 
higher during a far longer period of time. Moreover, the negative spillover effects on consumption 
and investment in the RoU are stronger. Still, output growth is positive in the RoU via higher exports 
of goods thanks to a real depreciation of goods relative to the goods produced by the RoW.  
A shock on the sovereign risk premium of the domestic country has a negative impact not only on the 
domestic public sector but also on the domestic private sector. Yet, output growth is possible as long 
as the country can exports more to the RoU and to the RoW. This shock has some positive effects on 
the RoU because the lower interest rate on public bonds issued by the governments in the RoU helps 
to lower the cost of borrowing. Benefits are growing with the openness to the RoW. The model can 
thus be used to illustrate the economic downturn during the sovereign debt crisis in euro area 
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countries with high public indebtedness and low export capacity (such as Greece), and the faster 
economic recovery in some other countries perceived as less risky and with good performance in 
external trade (Germany).    
Contrary to what Christoffel, Jaccard and Kilponen (2011) found in a closed-economy model, we 
showed that a procyclical fiscal policy does not necessarily lead to a higher sovereign risk premium 
at least in the short term because such a policy accentuates output growth and leads to a lower 
increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. In the long term, the sovereign risk premium is higher with 
a pro-cyclical fiscal policy though, because public debt is higher. Our result is also much dependent 
on the openness of both countries to the RoW. 
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